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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellants stipulate that jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by 78-2-2(3)(i)/ 
Utah Code Ann./ (1953 as amended)/ providing for appellate 
jurisdiction over orders/ judgments and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
This is an appeal of a quiet-title action involving 
real property located in Cache County/ Utah/ and tried before the 
First Judicial District Court in and for Cache County/ State of 
Utah/ without a jury/ before the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court misapply the law in 
determining that Appellants had no right to or interest in the 
real property by reason of adverse possession? 
2. Are the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision/ Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law substantially supported by the 
evidence presented at trial? 
iv 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR OLESON, aka VICTOR 
LAMAR OLESON, AND THELMA 
OLESON, 
Plaintiffs-AppellantSi 
BARBARA LYNN JEPPSON, aka 
BARBARA LYNN OLESON JEPPSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Appeal No. 870152 
Category No. 13b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE* 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Victor LaMar Oleson and Thelma 
Oleson, by and through counsel, Lowell V. Summerhays, hereby 
restate and present the Statement of the Case in accordance with 
proper directives as outlined in the brief of Respondent. 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet-title action instituted in the First 
Judicial District Court in and for Cache County, State of Utah, 
by Plaintiffs-Appellants Victor LaMar Oleson and Thelma Oleson 
(hereinafter "Appellants"). Appellants appeal the decision of 
*References to the Court's file are designated as follows: 
Record (R. ); Exhibits (E. ); Transcript (T. ). 
References to the Addendum are designated as follows: (A. ) 
Appellants1 Reply Brief on Appeal; and (R.B. (A- ) Respondent's 
Brief. 
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the Court below quieting title to this real property in 
Defendant-Respondent Barbara Lynn Jeppson (hereinafter 
"Respondent") as fee simple owner and denying them an interest 
in this property. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants filed their Complaint against Respondent 
seeking to establish their ownership rights to real property 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-40-1 on or about Dec. 31/ 1984 (R.B. A-61). 
Appellants claim ownership on the grounds of a trust arrangement/ 
contractual agreement/ unjust enrichment and adverse possession 
upon Appellants1 payment of the taxes/ water assessments/ 
property maintenance and property improvements from 1961 through 
the 1980fs (T. 5; T. 6; T. 9; T. 24; T. 34) (R.B. A-61-66). 
Respondent/ "as a housekeeping matter/" filed a 
Counterclaim asking that the Court clear title in Respondent's 
name in this action on the same day upon which trial was held/ on 
June 17/ 1986 (T. 8). Appellants filed a Motion in Limine 
seeking an exclusion of evidence at trial (R. 41). The case was 
tried without a jury/ and Appellants Motion in Limine was argued 
at the commencement of trial (T. 3-8). The issue was taken under 
advisement pending supportive evidence developed at trial/ 
subject to Appellants1 objections during trial and the Court's 
rulings thereon (T. 6-8). 
At trial/ the Court received Respondent's Trial 
Memorandum (R. 51)/ testimony and documentary evidence. After 
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trial/ the Court further received Appellants1 Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities (R. 67)/ Respondent's Reply (R. 78) and 
heard closing arguments of counsel prior to entering his 
Memorandum Decision (R. 90). 
Thereafter/ the Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 99) and Decree of Judgment (R. 106). 
Appellants' attorney then filed his Withdrawal of Counsel (R. 95) 
and Appellant/Attorney pro-se filed his Notice of Appeal on March 
9, 1987. 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Court below entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law/ Decree and Judgment on February 10/ 1987/ 
denying Appellants' claims of interest in the real property and 
quieting title in Respondent as sole owner. 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1/ 1961/ Appellants purchased certain real 
property and associated water rights located in North Logan/ 
Cache County/ Utah/ from John and Clara Krebes (T. 31). Said 
property was paid for over a period of eight years at the 
purchase price of a thousand dollars ($1/000.00) a year (T. 31). 
Final payment was received by the Krebes on July 16/ 1967/ and a 
Warranty Deed was given to Appellants on November 7/ 1969 
(T. 33). Appellants recorded said deed the same day and 
Appellants further conveyed an interest in a portion of said 
property by recorded deed the same day to Respondent (T. 36). 
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Said conveyance of property was in reliance upon Respondent's 
advice that said transaction would protect Appellants1 interest 
in the property (T. 19/ 36/ 67). Appellants drove to the 
residence of Respondent the same day said deeds were recorded/ at 
which time a conversation ensued properly placing Respondent on 
notice as to the understanding involving the trust arrangement 
(T. 38/ 41). Appellants continued to improve/ enhance and pay 
taxes on the property for ten (10) years thereafter or until 1979 
without any contact whatsoever from Respondent regarding the 
property or requesting an accounting thereof (T. 89). Extensive 
work and farming was done by Appellants to maintain and improve 
the property as described at tried and outlined with specificity 
(T. 48-60). Appellants did wish to provide Respondent a lot from 
the property conveyed in trust to her; however/ Respondent did 
not at any time intend the entire 2.2 acres as a gift to 
Respondent (T. 79)/ and on December 27/ 1981/ Appellant drove 
with Respondent to the site for the purpose of designating a one-
third acre lot of Respondent's choice for her eventual ownership 
and use (T. 69-71). In 1979/ Appellants asked Respondent to deed 
the property in trust to Appellants' sisters in order to further 
protect their interests (T. 94). Respondent did not give up the 
property to Appellants' sisters (T. 95) and commenced payment of 
taxes on said property for the year 1980 commencing on May 3/ 
1982 (T. 95). Appellants filed their Notice of Interest in the 
real property on December 1/ 1982 (T. 94). On August 31/ 1983/ a 
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party by the name of Cossins paid the taxes for 1983 in the 
amount of $209.31 (T. 139). On January 31/ 1984, Appellants 
filed the Complaint to quiet title in their name as to the 
subject property (R.B. A-61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law reflect several construed facts not supported 
by any evidence at trial or, in the alternative, raise 
presumptions inferred by the Court and not testified to at trial 
and presents opinions unsubstantiated by law. A presumption 
inferred and not supported by the evidence cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MISAPPLYING THE LAW 
IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO RIGHT TO 
OR INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY BY REASON 
OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The Trial Court found in its Memorandum Decision that 
the Appellants failed to establish an interest in the property by 
reason of adverse possession (A. 4). 
Appellants argued in their Brief on Appeal that 
Appellants did meet the criterion for a finding of adverse 
possession in the interest of Appellants. (See Appellants' Brief 
on Appeal pp. 14 and 15.) 
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982) stands for 
the proposition that if a person pays taxes and occupies the 
property, then he acquires the property by adverse possession. 
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The trial transcript is clear on the fact that Appellants 
occupied the property in question well in excess of seven 
continuous years/ utilized the same and controlled the same 
without even a discussion or inquiry (T. 89) by the Respondent. 
(See/ also Reply Brief Addendum.) 
Surely there is no question that Appellants occupied 
the property for the requisite time and paid the taxes for the 
requisite time and/ therefore/ have acquired the property by 
adverse possession. (See, Reply Brief Addendum.) The following 
statutes clearly define adverse possession as set forth in Utah 
78-12-7. Adverse possession—Possession presumed in 
owner.—In every action for the recovery of real 
property/ or the possession thereof/ the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time 
required by law; and the occupation of the property by 
any other person shall be deemed to have been under and 
in subordination to the legal title/ unless it appears 
that the property has been held and possessed adversely 
to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written 
instrument or judgement. Where it appears that there 
has been an actual continued occupation of land under 
claim of title/ exclusive of any other right/ but not 
founded upon a written instrument/ judgment or decree/ 
the land so actually occupied/ and no other/ is deemed 
to have been held adversely. 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not 
under written instrument. For the purpose of 
constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming 
title/ not founded upon a written instrument/ judgment 
or decree land is deemed to have been possessed and 
occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
inclosure. 
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(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or 
improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon 
dams/ canals/ embankments/ aqueducts or otherwise for 
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the 
sum of $5 per acre. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous/ and taxes 
paid. In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provisions of any 
section of this code/ unless it shall be shown that the 
land has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously/ and that the party/ his 
predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon such land according 
to law. 
See the Addendum to this Reply Brief which clearly 
demonstrates evidence of Appellants' adverse possession as 
testified to and exhibited at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ISSUING A MEMORANDUM RULING, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHICH WERE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
The Court erroneously presumed answers to questions 
that were not resolved. There is no logical or legal basis for 
the ultimate conclusion when the ultimate conclusion is based on 
presumption. See, Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service 
Commission/ 720 P.2d 373 Utah. In Crites v. Crites/ 322 P.2d 
1046 (Colo. 1958)/ the Colorado Supreme Court found that "the 
judgment of the court was not in fact a judicial determination 
and not based on any evidence/ as the court candidly states." 
A, 
The Court presumes that Appellants' agreement to pay 
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taxes was in the interest of Respondent/ when testimony at trial 
shows that Appellants1 intent to pay taxes was in their own 
interest. 
The Court says in its Memorandum Decision that: "The 
plaintiff himself testified himself that at the time he conveyed 
the property to the defendant/ he told her that he would take 
care of the taxes on the property" (A. 3). What plaintiff in 
fact testified to can be found in the trial transcript as 
follows: 
Q. Did you pay the taxes for her/ for the defendant? 
A. NO/ indeed. 
Q. Who did you pay the taxes for? 
A. For myself. 
Q. What about the water assessment? Did you pay that 
for her? 
A. NO/ for myself entirely. 
(T. 81). 
Appellants1 attorney's preliminary statement contained 
the following: 
. . . she said/ for example/ 'I can't afford to pay the 
taxes/' and then Mr. Oleson says, 'Well/ you're not 
going to pay the taxes/ it's not yours/ you don't have 
an interest in it/ you have no responsibility regarding 
it/ merely putting it in your name' as she instructed/ 
'and I'll pay the taxes and I will take care of it/ 
I'll maintain it/ I'll upgrade it/ I'll pay the water 
assessment/ I'll pay all of the taxes/' and did so. 
(T. 11, T. 12) 
Respondent's testimony that Appellants had gifted the 
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property (T. 134) is contradicted by her own testimony that there 
was no discussion as to the payment of taxes (T. 124) and by her 
own behavior in failing to pay the taxes or even inquiring about 
them or the property for a period in excess of ten years (T. 89). 
B. 
The Court presumes that Appellant-husband would not 
have his new wife present and sign the deed if he were protecting 
himself from that same wife (A.2). 
The Court/ in its Memorandum Decision/ asks the 
following: 
This raises certain questions as to the plaintiff's 
position/ because if he says he was deeding the 
property to the defendant to protect himself from his 
new wife taking it/ why wouldn't he have his new wife 
present at this time and sign the deed? 
(A.2) 
The Court does not resolve this question upon any 
logical or legal basis that can be found in the Memorandum 
Decision (A. 1-4). The only testimony received at trial as to 
this issue is quoted as follows: 
Q. Tell us what was said. 
A. (Thelma Oleson) He told me that he was putting 
this two acres in Barbara's name in trust for him 
because he'd lost two houses to two previous wives and 
he did not want to take the chance on that happening 
again. And losing a piece of property that he had 
worked for. 
Q. Did the two of you discuss on that occasion that 
it be held in trust? 
A. Yes, 
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(T. 115). 
Appellants argue that the mutual understanding of 
spouses was tantamount to a prenuptial agreement where the 
Appellant-wife respected the wishes of Appellant-husband to 
protect his interest in the property in light of previous bad 
experiences in marriage dissolutions and the resulting 
dissipation of all of Appellant-husband's assets (T. 30). 
C. 
The Court presumes that Appellant would not have 
waited ten (10) years to ask for the property back if it was 
conveyed to protect himself (A. 2). 
Appellant testified that it was ten (10) years before 
he learned that it would better protect his interest to transfer 
title out of the Respondent's name (T. 89/ T. 94). 
D. 
The Court presumes that Appellant would have conveyed 
the entire 8.7 acres rather than only 2.2 acres if he were trying 
to protect himself from his new wife (A. 2). 
There is no direct testimony in the trial transcript 
which would be the basis for a legal conclusion on this question 
(T. 1 through T. 141). Appellants' attorney did offer an 
explanation as to Appellants' actions transferring the 2.2 acres 
as follows: 
Mr. Walsh: . . . He had an equitable interest to that 
point/ and when he made his last payment the legal 
title passed to him/ he had the deed recorded which had 
been held in escrow/ and now he's at the crossroads 
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which he's already discussed with the defendant as to 
what he should do and the defendant had suggested to 
him these alternatives. 
And so Mr. Oleson then decided Well/ what I'll do 
then is I'll take part of the property that I'm 
receiving/ this red area here/ and I'll put that in the 
defendant's name consistent with what she's told me is 
a good way to do it/ and he held the other property in 
his own name/ this black area here. 
E. 
The Court presumes that Appellants asked for only a 
part of the 2.2 acres back and cited Exhibit 12 in that regard 
(A. 4 and A. 51-53). 
Exhibit 12 refers to Appellants' intent in 1980 for the 
eventual disposition of the property and confirms Appellants' 
claim to the entire 2.2 acres/ describing the ultimate intent as 
follows: 
There are 2.2 acres and enough for a third acre 
building lot for Dee and Vic and one for you and each 
of the boys with .22 acre left over for a right of way. 
(A. 52) 
Nowhere in Exhibit 12/ or anywhere in the record or 
transcript/ is there evidence of Appellants' claim to less than 
the entire property in question. Some of the testimony at trial 
confirming Appellants' claim to the entire acreage is found in 
the trial transcript at pages 93-95. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has properly and correctly identified the 
scope of review which must be applied in the case at bar. That 
being a matter of equity and reasonableness. A total review of 
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the facts of this case clearly and absolutely demonstrate no 
equitable decision has been reached and further that without 
equity there cannot be a reasonable resolution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this /Q.' day of February/ 
1988. 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
V-h^/t/J -< 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
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ADDENDUM I 
EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
From 1969 to present managed property/ T. 62 - 64 
paid taxes and water assessment Exh. 1, Brief A. 25 
Appellant paid taxes 1961 to 1984 with 
3 exceptions 
1980 and 1985 paid by Respondent T. 138 
1983 paid by L.E. Cossins T. 138 - 139 
T. 64 line 10 erroneous 
1984 taxes paid by Appellant/ not 
Respondent 
Installed sprinkling system 1 T. 34 
Paid water assessment from 1972 to date T. 60/ Exh. 5/ 
Brief A. 22 
Paid water assessment from 1961 to 1985 T. 64 
Tenant sent Appellants check for Crops T. 58 - 59 
Appellant collected rent 1984 to 1985 T. 58 - 59, Exh. 4 
Brief A. 19 
Sprayed old orchard on 2.2 acres T. 55 
Sprayed old orchard on 2.2 acres T. 56 
Harvested old orchard on 2.2 acres T. 56 
Harvested wild plums on 2.2 acres T. 56 
Set traps for coddeling moths T. 57 
Planted 18 grapes on south fence T. 57 
Irrigation system maintained T. 56 
Gaskets and pipe couples replaced at 
cost of $200.00 and sprinkler 
heads replaced T. 56 
Weeds controlled with roundup T. 56 
A-l 
Installed steel replacement posts T 
Reattached fallen wires T 
Posted no trespassing signs T 
Harvested apples in old orchard on 
2.2 acres T 
Planted and harvested crops of alfalfa/ 
barley/ corn/ peas T 
Irrigation crops and orchard with sprinkler T 
Government approved poison set in orchards 
to control mice T 
A-2 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) copies 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, on this /& day 
of February, 1988. 
B.L. Dart, Esq. 
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq. 
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